Middlegames and Positional Sacrifices:

China's 'New Security Concept's and Multilateral Cooperation

Dr. Marc Lanteigne

Dalhousie University

Halifax, Canada

Email: marc.lanteigne@dal.ca / lanteigne_marc@yahoo.ca

June 2004

 

Conference

Beyond the Party-State: State, Law and Society in Contemporary China

Centre for East Asian Studies, Warsaw, Poland

(Draft copy only. Comments welcome.)

Introduction: Middlegame Security?

 

One of the most important components of the current reform era in China can be found in the area of military doctrine and policy. Although the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been the subject of doctrinal reform in the past, most notably after the death of Mao Zedong, the current period of policy restructuring has presented new challenges to a state and regime which is struggling to bring its strategic ideas into a new era. Much of this new policy thinking on the part of China stems from the fact that conflict in the international system is being defined less and less by state-to-state conflict and more by civil war, non-traditional security issues, and the threat of international terrorism. As a result, Beijing has attempted to move its security interests on the international level further away from the idea of alliances and closer to the concept of cooperation between governments while maintaining a strong focus on the "Westphalian" idea of the importance of state sovereignty and "non-interference". The most concrete evidence of these new policy shifts has been the Chinese government's 1990s canon of the "new security concept" (NSC), an idea which while still in its infancy, is nevertheless taking on increasing levels of importance in Beijing's foreign and strategic policies. The NSC, which has its origins in previous initiatives by the Chinese government to modernise both its military and its strategic policies, reflects a far more multifaceted approach to security and cooperation, as evidenced by Beijing's initiatives in developing bilateral strategic partnerships as well as interacting in a more positive fashion with multilateral institutions, especially on the regional, Asia-Pacific level. As the NSC grows, it is becoming more necessary for an examination of the concept to be undertaken in order to understand its origins as well as its components. Also, it is important to question whether these new policies are attuned with China's modern security challenges and will remain so for the near future. An initial conclusion which can be drawn is that the NSC is a watershed policy shift in China's strategic thinking, but should not yet be interpreted as a permanent change. Instead, China may be shifting from an opening process in its security policy development to one which reflects a "middlegame" strategy. What is unclear, however, is what the endgame of China's security strategy will be comprised of.

 

3Origins and Predecessors

The development of this new thinking on security and cooperation stemmed from Chinese displeasure at the methods employed by other great powers, especially those in the West, toassure their security since the end of the cold war. For example, a 1997 editorial in the Beijing Review noted that standard security practices among states were the creation of alliances designed to counter a mutual enemy, large powers protecting smaller ones, and weaker states deferring to stronger ones. Moreover, the security of states and state cooperation was traditionally seen as being "incompatible" as measures taken by one country to better protect itself invariably created insecurities in others, a nod to the western international relations concept of the "security dilemma". However, the piece argued that at the close of the twentieth century, state security interests had become so intertwined that it was necessary to approach the ideas of security and cooperation from a different, more conciliatory standpoint.1 The NSC as a model could be considered one result of that call for new considerations. The NSC draws heavily on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and stresses equality and non-discrimination, mutual trust and benefits and the non-interference in states' sovereign affairs.2 The Five Principles have their origins in talks between China, Burma and India in the 1950s as means were sought to promote peaceful interaction between states with different social systems in ways which discouraged alliance or bloc mindsets, which the states agreed often led to mistrust and conflict. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was credited with their development into Chinese foreign policy doctrine in 1954. The Five Principles (mutual respect for sovereignty and territory, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence), were also praised by China for their flexibility and resiliency, since they were adaptable to both cold war and post-cold war strategic interactions.31 A. Ying, "New Security Mechanism Needed for Asian-Pacific Region," Beijing Review (August 18-24, 1997): 6-7. 2 "Some Thoughts on Establishing a New Regional Security Order," Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang at the East-West Center's Senior Policy Seminar, 7 August 2000, Honolulu. Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People's Republic of China, 2000, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/5180.html>, (Accessed November 12th, 2001). 3 Joseph W.S. Cheng and Zhang Wankun, "Patterns and Dynamics of China's International Strategic Behavior," Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, ed. uisheng Zhao (Armonk, NY and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 185; Andrew Scobell, China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 29.4 Indeed, the Five Principles experienced a renaissance in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of international efforts, led by the United States and the West, towards humanitarian intervention, exemplified tacitly by the first Gulf War and more overtly by interventions in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti during the 1990s. China's response to this international trend, as illustrated in the watershed article by Yi Ding in the Beijing Review (1990), was that humanitarian intervention had the potential of damaging international law and giving a green light to strong countries wishes to impose their views on weaker ones.4 The Five Principles could therefore be seen as a firewall against such abuses. Although Beijing's stance on intervention has softened since the end of that decade, as evidenced by China's positive response to the United Nations' operations in East Timor (now Timor Leste) in 1999,5 the country still takes a very cautious approach to interference in domestic affairs of other states, and Beijing has indicated that certain conditions are required (such as UN approval) for "proper" intervention to take place. One major question yet to be completely answered is whether the current war on terrorism will continue to erode Beijing's previouslyrigid stance towards the observance of stare sovereignty. As a result of China's own terrorism challenges, the differentiation between "good" and "bad" intervention will likely continue to grow more distinct. At the same time, a direct precursor to the NSC can be traced at least as far back as attempts during the opening months of the Dengist regime to reform outdated perceptions of "people's war" with new ideas to better suit "modern conditions". The idea of people's war, which involved the tactics of active defence, luring an enemy in deep, and focussing on superior numbers to assure victory, was considered largely untouchable for the duration of Mao's regime.6 However, although historians and analysts frequently point to 1975 as the time when the people's war concept was moved aside by serious military policy reforms, it was noted that the idea rarely translated well into actual policy and indeed was challenged far earlier than the 1970s, when Mao's declining political presence allowed for such revisionist thought. For example, in 1959 4 Yi Ding, "Upholding the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," Beijing Review, (February 26th-March 4th, 1990): 13-6. 5 See Bates Gill and James Reilly, "Sovereignty, intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing," Survival 42(3) (Autumn 2000): 41-59.6 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford university Press, 1994), 211-3. 5 Peng Dehuai, Mao's (ill-fated) defence minister openly questioned whether people's war was compatible with China's post-revolutionary foreign policy, especially in the wake of the Korean War, which certainly did not follow Mao's views on the proper waging of war.7 After Mao's death, little time was spared by Deng Xiaoping and his allies in re-evaluating not only China's military capabilities, placing more value on technological advancements and power projection, but also strategic policy.

As a result of Beijing's warming relations with two former rivals, the United States and Japan, resulting in the creation of a stronger counterweight to the Soviet Union, Deng felt that the country's level of confidence was, by the late 1970s, sufficient to reform the PLA and de-link the Chinese economy from the military, while continuing to place a strong focus on national security demanded by the state.8 As illustrated by Deng's defence minister, Xu Xianqian, in 1979, changes in the international strategic system necessitated a military doctrine which better suited the need for modernised armed forces and "solving problems realistically," as well as the need to "study the enemy".9 However, the most significant changes between Chinese foreign policy in the late 1970s and that of today are a higher level of confidence and a greater acceptance of multilateralism as a means to ensure greater security. By the 1990s, military modernisation had accelerated and Chinese strategy focussed on "local, limited war" and "asymmetrical conflict" in response to changing power shifts in the international system, especially as a result of the growth of American military power.10 However, this thinking represented but one part of the equation, since not only did possible new patterns of conflict need to be considered, but at the same time the question of strategic cooperation to prevent war also needed to be studied, an issue which took on more urgency as Beijing expanded its diplomatic interests and opened its markets, thus increasing Chinese interdependence.

Other components of the NSC have been derived from more recent polices, including then-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's overview of China's "New International Political Order" in 7 Robert S. Wang, "China's Evolving Strategic Doctrine," Asian Survey 24(10) (October 1984) 1043. 8 Even A. Feigenbaum, China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 74-5. 9 Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 78-9. 10 Donald Puchala, "Some Implications of China's Military Modernization," Issues and Studies 3791) (January/February 2001): 108-12. 6 the early 1990s, as well as Beijing's policies of developing "strategic partnerships" with select states, including Russia, the United States, the EU, Pakistan, India, Canada, South Africa and Saudi Arabia during that decade.11 However, what has distinguished this new doctrine, as Liu notes, is that unlike previous strategic ideologies which aligned China against perceived enemy forces, especially imperialism and later hegemonism, the NSC does not identify a third party as an adversary but rather embraces the idea of bu shu di ("do not seek an enemy").12 As well, China has also advocated increasing political, economical and technological cooperation as a further means of strengthening ties between states, rather than using only military power as a basis for linkages.13 During the course of the 1990s, Beijing developed this concept as a strategic paradigm to counter the alliance-based forms of cooperation which were favoured by Western powers during the cold war, but which in China's view were being inappropriately carried over into the postcold war international system. The primary example which illustrated the longevity of the alliance is system is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), an organisation which defied naysayers who predicted its demise after the 1980s by not only enduring but expanding its mandate to include operations in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan but also increasing its membership to include former Warsaw Pact states. Moreover, through various initiatives such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP), NATO's sphere of interest extended well into Central Asia during the 1990s, much closer to China's sensitive Western borders. The idea of alternatives to the alliance system was also elaborated upon within China's 2000 and 2002 National Defence White Papers, which stressed that "multilateral securitydialogue and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region should be oriented towards and characterized by mutual respect instead of the strong bullying the weak, cooperation instead of confrontation, 11 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2002), 292; Joseph Y.S. Cheng and Zhang Wankun, "Patterns and Dynamics of China's International Strategic Behaviour," Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, ed. Suisheng Zhao (Armonk, NY and London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 179-206. 12 Guoli Liu, "Introduction," Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Guyter, 2004), 17. 13 H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong, "The Foreign Policy Outlook of China's 'Third Generation' Elite," The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 144. 7 and seeking consensus instead of imposing one's will on others."14 This form of security thinking was judged by China to be more compatible with the country's strategic interests during the transitional period away from cold war bipolarity. However, a closer look at the main themes of the NSC provides a deeper insight into Beijing's changing security, and foreign policy, priorities.

The NSC's Specifics

The actual blueprint of China's proposed new security thinking has not been completely formulated, and is at present distinguished as much by what it is against, namely alliances andzero-sum strategic concepts, as what it is for, consensus-based, equal, and non-interventionist state cooperation, a definitive echo of the Five Principles. The NSC's origins lie within theChinese government's 1998 White Paper on Security, which specified that, "To obtain lasting peace, it is imperative to abandon the cold war mentality, cultivate a new concept of security and seek a new way to safeguard peace."15 Nevertheless, China may continue to make use of both strategic institutions to further develop and promote its new thinking as a means of attempting to counter the development of alliances and hierarchical security institutions around its periphery. What remains to be seen is whether the new security concept introduced by Beijing can accomplish this, especially since, as Duffield noted, China's rapid growth in military and economic power may strengthen the very American-based alliances Beijing argues against and possibly even create new ones.16 Thus, Beijing is anxious to make use of existing institutions, especially those which allow for each member to express a veto, in the Asian region to promote the development of security based on non-alliance principles and hopefully to convince other actors in the region that the development of an anti-China bloc would be detrimental to regional peace. In the case of the ARF, China has cooperated with the organisation as a means to assure 14 China's National Defence in 2000, (Beijing: Information Office of the People's Republic of China, October 2000), 48. 15 China's National Defence (2004), (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, July 1998) <http://news.xinhuanet.com/employment/2002-11/18/content_633176.htm> (Accessed March 17th, 2004). 16 John S. Duffield. "Why is There No APTO? Why is There No OSCAP? Asia-Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective," Contemporary Security Policy 22(2) (August 2001): 87.8 neighbours that it is not a threat to the stability of the Asia-Pacific and one of the benefits of this goodwill may be increased political and economic ties between the region and Beijing. Moreover, a direct linkage can be drawn between the NSC and the concept of "cooperative security", meaning security which cannot be achieved unilaterally or via foreign policy behaviour described as exclusively defensive in nature.17 Therefore, there needs to be a strategy of inclusion, not only in terms of actors which can participate but also policies which can be included on a given agenda, including non-traditional security issues. Although the idea of cooperative security had been coined in North America during the late 1980s, it was not until the following decade that the idea began to be conceptualised and researched via Canadian and Australian academic and governmental initiatives which suggested that not only should Asia-Pacific Security dialogue be inclusive in terms of participants, but also in the area of ideas which go beyond the traditional concepts of security, including economics, social issues, health and economics. This process, as applied to the Asian framework, has stressed gradual implementation and a variety of formal and informal, bilateral and multilateral methods to foster discussion. 18 Cooperative security has developed into a common staple of Asian regional dialogue both on the governmental level and via "Track II" mechanisms, especially as a means of encouraging communication and confidence-building among states with differing strategic priorities. The NSC has identified strategic issues which extend beyond those of traditional security, including economic security and the idea that trade can be reconfigured into a more win-win scenario benefiting more states and preventing conflict over discrimination and market barriers. 19 As the 1998 White Paper noted, "Such steps can form the economic basis of global and regional security." 20 This idea has been accentuated though a variety of case examples which Beijing assessed with the benefit of first-hand knowledge. These have included the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-8 which not only caused lasting economic damage through much China periphery 17 David DeWitt, "Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security," Pacific Review 7(1) (1994) 1-16. 18 Brian Job, "Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideation Contribution to the Evolving Asia Security Order," Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003),245. 19 David Finkelstein and Michael McDevitt, "Competition and Consensus: China's "New Concept of Security and the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region," PacNet 198) (January 8th, 1999) <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/asia/Finkelstein010999.html> (Accessed January 26th, 2002). 20 China's National Defence (1998). 9 (including Southeast Asia, Japan, Korea and Russia), but also strong security ramifications, especially in Indonesia.21 More recently, the stalled talks of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organisation, has been of economic and strategic concern to Beijing. The latest WTO round entered into a near-total state of paralysis in the wake of the aborted Cancun talks in September 2003.22 China, in seeking to promote trade talks geared towards eliminating the trade inequalities and protectionism between the developed and developing members, tacitly allied itself with the Group of 22 (G-22) developing nations, drawing praise for its conservative approach to the complex issues dividing developed and developing members of the WTO.23 Although Beijing was less vocal on the issues of trade inequality than other large developing economies within the G-22, namely Brazil and India, this example does indeed illustrate the increasing importance of economic cooperation in ensuring international accord. Similar examples of "cooperative" security thinking were also evident during outgoing Chinese president Jiang Zemin's speech at the 16th Party Congress in November 2002. In the section on China's external affairs, he noted that China's strategic interests would include dissuading hegemony, advocating different paths to development for different countries, promoting economic globalisation in ways which would create mutual benefits, fighting international terrorism, and offering support for "extensive people-to-people diplomacy" designed to increase linkages and communication.24 All of these issues have been carried over, not surprisingly, to the foreign policy under Hu Jintao, as development of the new ideas of the NSC continues. 21 For example, see, Paul Dibb, David D. Hale and Peter Prince. "The Strategic Implications of Asia's Economic Crisis," Survival 40(2) (Summer 1998): 5-26. 22 See Jagdish Bhagwati, "Don't Cry for Cancun," Foreign Affairs 83(1) (January / February 2004): 57-60. 23 David Murphy, "The Fine Art of Failure," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 25th, 2003 <http://www.feer.com/articles/2003/0309_25/p024region.html> (Accessed June 10th, 2004). 24 Jiang Zemin, "Build a Well-Off Society in All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (Report to the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, November 8th, 2002)" Documents of the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2002), 56-9.10 The NSC and Institutional Engagement The most visible example of China's shift towards policies consistent with the new security concept, in addition to the partnership idea, has been Beijing's new engagement with international security institutions. It has been demonstrated through empirical research that Beijing's rate of participation in inter-state international institutions dedicated to security rose sharply in the 1980s and continued at a steady pace during the following decade. 25 Such changes, however, necessitated great changes in strategic thinking which this author argues has made impressive progress but is not yet complete. On the international level, Beijing reversed its policy towards the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, and in June 2004 the Chinese government expressed its wish to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) after releasing a December 2003 White Paper clarifying its views on the export of nuclear weapons components.26 The latter policy change is especially significant in light of previous accusations levelled by the United States that Beijing oversaw the transfer of technology linked to weapons of mass destruction and weapons delivery vehicles to states such as Iran and Pakistan in the 1990s.27 Changes in China's institutional engagement have been even more dramatic over the past decade on the region level, with China actively participating in strategic regimes in the Asia-Pacific region and, in the case of Central Asia, working to address gaps in security institution-building. The Asean Regional Forum (ARF) and the newer Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) have acted as useful platforms for China to accentuate its NSC doctrine. The ARF has brought together twenty-three states across Asia and North America to discuss mutual strategic issues. The ARF, which would become the vanguard for regional attempts at constructing an Asia-Pacific multilateral security institution, was created in Bangkok in 1994. The membership of the forum is extensive, bringing together twenty-one members from both sides of the Pacific 25 For example, see Alistair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions," Engaging China: the Management of an Emerging Power (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 238-44. 26 "China seeks non-proliferation group status," People's Daily, June 4th 2004, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200406/04/eng20040604_145307.html> (Accessed June 9th, 2004). 27 David Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 84. 11 Ocean as well as the European Union.28 Since the organisation first met in 1994, the ARF has attempted to provide a forum for members to address regional political and security issues as well as developing policies of regional cooperation, confidence-building issues, and avoidance of conflict. However, the fact that the ARF operates by consensus (with each member having to approve any given measure placed on the table, and thus having de facto veto power over all measures decided upon). While this approach has been advantageous in the sense that it has prevented a hierarchy from developing in ARF debates and has stressed inclusiveness in regional problem-solving, it has also prevented sensitive security issues, namely Taiwan and the question of territorial ownership of the South China Sea. The origins of the SCO rest within the both the various agreements which formalised the demarcation of the border between China and the former Soviet republics, and the April 1996 Five-Power Agreement, signed in Shanghai between China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, which regulated military activity in the border regions and forbade exercises which could be perceived as threatening by other members.29 The original agreement also encouraged the sharing of strategic information, conducting joint military exercises, and increasing of military and governmental contacts between signatory countries. After the signing, there was an increase in bilateral meetings between Chinese and Russian military officials, including inspections and Chinese arms purchases from Moscow.30 The Agreement proved beneficial for China as it served the dual purposes of reducing tensions on what had previously been a very tense frontier while increasing the level of China's persuasive power in Central Asia which, since the USSR's sundering, had been defined by instability, weak government and weak states.

Following the Shanghai meeting, the five signatories agreed to further contacts to coordinate shared security concerns, and although the group was never codified into a formal institution at this time, the "Shanghai Five" became an important tool enabling China to address its evolving 28 The ARF's membership includes all ten ASEAN states (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), as well as the Russian Federation, Mongolia, Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, People's Republic of China, India, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, and the European Union.

29 John W. Garver, "Sino-Russian Relations," in China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Boulder, Co. and Oxford, UK, Westview Press, 1998), 122-3. 30 Kenneth W. Allen, "Confidence-Building Measures and the People's Liberation Army," Remaking the Chinese State: Strategies, Society and Security, ed. Chien-min Chao and Bruce J. Dickson (New York and London: Routledge, 2001), 235-6.12 foreign policies in Central Asia, filling a institutional void on the sensitive Chinese western frontier. The Shanghai Five took an important step towards greater formalization and international visibility in June 2001 when, while welcoming the group's newest member, Uzbekistan, into the fold, a declaration was signed which formed the genesis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Not only did the founding of the SCO signal a desire to deepen the structure of regional cooperation, but also to expand its mandate beyond purely security matters. According to the declaration, the SCO's mandate would be to build trust and cooperation between members, address peace and security issues, and promote cooperation in the areas of trade, science and technology, culture, energy, and the environment."31 The third SCO conference in Moscow in June 2003 established a permanent Secretariat in Beijing and designated noted Chinese ambassador Zhang Deguang as the organisation's first Secretary-General.32 Both events were seen as necessary steps to move the SCO from the status of informal talking shop to permanent community. The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was signed the same month by the six members, and the SCO Anti-Terrorism Centre, a long-delayed project, was finally inaugurated in Tashkent in 2004.33 Despite some attempts by Western analysts to brand the SCO as an alliance, or at least an embryonic one, member states have taken great care to deny that moniker and instead present the SCO as a community dedicated to security and cooperation and not aligned against a third party state, but rather the non-state challenges of terrorism, splittism and extremism, the so-called "three evils". The membership of the SCO is united not only in their desire to prevent terrorist activity on their soil, but also to affirm support for each member's governments and, eventually, to see cooperation move beyond the hard security realm and into other areas, including economics and trade. On the subject of terrorism, although China had traditionally been reluctant to see the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum add a security dimension to its mandate 31 "Declaration on the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation," Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan, June 15th, 2001 http://missions.itu.int/~kazaks/eng/sco/sco02.htm. 32 Matthew Oresman, "The Moscow Summit: Tempered Hope for the SCO," Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, June 4th, 2003, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1462> (Accessed January 18th, 2004). 33 Li Jing and Hu Xiao, "SCO Embarks on Key Development Stage," China Daily, June 14th, 2004, 1. 13 (despite American pressure) during the 1990s, the impact of 9/11 has prompted the forum to examine ways of cooperating in the name of preventing terrorism and threats to economic security in the APEC region. The most visible example of this has been the Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) which was created by APEC Senior Officials in February 2003 in order to promote "secure trade in the APEC region" (commonly referred to as the STAR initiative), combat terrorist developments within the Asia-Pacific and address the specific threats of weapons of mass destruction as well conventional weaponry which may be used by terrorists.34 In these areas, China has found a great deal of common ground with other APEC members. However, it remains to be seen whether these initiatives are the harbinger of the eventual creation of an APEC security pillar. A major area of contention between China and Western powers at the turn of the new century is the question of under what conditions is it appropriate for security concerns to override norms of national sovereignty in the name of humanitarian intervention. Despite some softening on this question over the past decade, the concept of humanitarian intervention may continue to be seen by many Chinese leaders as a game played by the rich and powerful few, a game which brings differences in state power and abilities into stark relief. As such, it is very unlikely that Beijing will attain a level of comfort with the idea of state intervention, especially while such interventions are continuously carried out in a unilateral fashion. Beijing's acceptance of American actions in Afghanistan after the September 11th terrorist attacks may indicate a change in Beijing's stance on the question of state sovereignty and military intervention.

However, this may be a temporary stance, since as long as China retains concerns that the United States may circumvent international norms and institutions as occurred with the Kosovo and Iraq operations, and as long as Beijing expresses concerns that its own interests may be the victim of such practices in the future, distrust will prevail. Institutions such as the ARF and its Track II subsidiaries would therefore provide useful sounding boards as a means to address the problems of intervention. Indeed, both the ARF and the SCO have been cited as being examples of the effectiveness of this new security thinking both for China and across Asia.35 Moreover, 34 "Counter Terrorism Task Force," Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation <http://www.Apecsec.org.sg/Apec/Apec_groups/som_special_task_groups/counter_terrorism.html>, (Accessed May 10th, 2004. 35 "Some Thoughts on Establishing a New Regional Security Order". 14 China's support for both institutions also suggests that Beijing wishes to counter the development of a more formal, Western-dominated network of security institutions which may exclude China or worse, be aligned against China's strategic interests. In Beijing's view, informal regimes and communities consistent with the NSC represent security developments based on confidence- and consensus-building, while still respecting the boundaries of state sovereignty. Advantages (and Limitations) of the NSC One of the major questions concerning the NSC which has yet to be completely addressed is whether the development of the concept is a reactive or active approach on the part of China to changing security circumstances in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. "Reactive" school thinking would suggest that the NSC is a direct response to Chinese dissatisfaction with the current, largely unipolar system of security and cooperation in the post-cold war system which still relies on balance-of-power and alliance-building. For example, Finkelstein drew a direct linkage from the development of the NSC to what he saw as China's "dissatisfaction and frustration" with an insufficiently multipolar world coupled with an expanded American and Western military presence into regions close to China, including the strengthening of American-Japanese security relations in 1996 and US military operations in Central Asia after 2001. At the same time, he argued that the NSC was also a means for China to further convince Southeast Asia of its newer, more benign approach to its peripheral security interests.36 However, while these factors have certainly contributed to the development of the NSC and China's current strategic thinking, they form only part of the equation, as a look at the "active" rationales is equally important. Since the beginning of the 1990s, China along with most other large powers in the international system, has been attempting to redefine its security interests to better reflect the end of bipolarity. Although many realists have suggested that the dissolution of the USSR ushered in a new era of unipolarity, or at least a weak form of such with the United States at the apex, this viewpoint says little about the many layers of security which have generated more attention over the past decade. For example, a recent work by Buzan and Waver advocated the idea that 36 David M. Finkelstein, "China's 'New Concept of Security'" The People's Liberation Army and China in Transition, ed. Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2003), 199-201. 15 international security is also a function of different security complexes which have changed shape since the end of the cold war.37 In the case of China, the NSC can be considered a way of creating greater linkages between maintaining a stable periphery and ensuring greater security on the international level. In other words, the NSC approaches international security as very much like that of an onion, with many layers making up the whole. This idea is very much in keeping with cooperative security theory, and as a result of China's growing confidence in its diplomatic skills, as evidenced by what was recently termed China's "new flexibility and sophistication" in its approaches to bilateralism, multilateralism and security relations,38 Beijing now has the confidence to link disparate forms of security together as it formulates its policies. As well, Beijing is very anxious to avoid any recurrence of diplomatic seclusion which it experienced during the height of the cold war, a situation which gave the country a mindset of being "isolated and surrounded",39 and was threatened with again after June 1989. Institutional engagement and a more comprehensive approach to security have addressed these concerned and have created much stronger ties between Chinese policy and international security issues.Interestingly enough, although there was much talk in the 1990s about embedding China within various international networks in order to prevent the country from developing into a giant revisionist power, the current embedding process is having an opposite effect as well, since as China develops a more distinct strategic policy through institutional engagement, whatever sovereign China is losing through institutional cooperation is being offset by the fact that international security is slowly but surely being increasingly tied to Chinese interests. Beijing's primary strategic concern on the regional level is that of containment, or to use the newer diplomatic term "strategic encirclement" by the United States and its allies. This concern is not without justification, since after the cold war Washington increased its strategic ties with Japan, South Korea and Russia, and since 9/11 American military ties with Southeast Asia and Central Asia have also grown considerably in a very short time. Since the 1990s, China 37 See Barry Buzan and Ole Waver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 38 Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 82(6) (November/December 2003): 24. 39 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London, Sydney and Wellington: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 447. 16 has decried any attempts to develop a "Natoesque" alliance structure.40 However, rather than assume the Soviet approach of matching alliance with alliance, Beijing's development of the NSC has advocated a separate method of non-alliance cooperation based on inclusiveness and, increasingly, ties to non-traditional security issues.

There is also the realisation within the Chinese government that security issues which it is currently facing have become increasingly intertwined and thus far too complex to address in aunilateral fashion. The most visible of these challenges is terrorism, but at the same time various aspects of economic security, energy, and trade have also become too complicated for Beijing to handle alone. As Beijing continues to expand its security interests beyond its periphery, there are an increasing number of opportunities but also a larger number of risks. Central Asia provides a prime case example of this, since China has been attempting to keep its visibility high in that region despite rising competition from Russia and the United States. At the same time, China is attempting to ensure that its western frontier is safe from separatist and terrorist activities. Community-building and the increasing number of bilateral and multilateral ties in the region have become increasingly important for Beijing to ensure the safety of its interests both within and outside of Chinese borders. These risks were recently illustrated by the tragic June 2004 loss in a terrorist attack of eleven Chinese employees of the China Railway Shisiju Group Corporation in Jalojir, Afghanistan.41 The NSC could be considered an acknowledgement of both Beijing's increased regional and international strategic interests plus its willingness to address security through multilateral options, a stance which would not have been acceptable to the Chinese government of decades ago. This is not to say, however, that the NSC marks a softening of China's security posture, nor should the NSC be credited with covering all of China's security concerns. For example, Taiwan remains a complicated issue which Beijing continues to maintain is an internal affair. As well, China has not been receptive to the idea of Taipei joining regional strategic institutions, and would certainly respond negatively to attempts by an outside actor to draw the island into an Asian security regime as a stand-alone actor. It is also unclear whether the NSC is being used to 40 Xiao Zan, "'Mini NATO' in Asia-Pacific Region Plan by the US and Australia." Beijing Review, September 13th, 2001: 10. See also Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past Present and Future (Washington, DC: Rand, 2000), 135-6.41 "Rebuilding activities to continue in Afghanistan: Chinese ambassador," People's Daily, June 11th, 2004 <http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/200406/11/print20040611_146016.html>, (Accessed June 11th, 2004). 17 redefine China's stance on the ownership of key sectors of the South China Sea. Although the longstanding dispute over the administrative rights of the Spratly Islands area has cooled since the 1990s, the issue is by no means resolved and observers are divided on the issue of whether China will eventually use physical force to cement its claim on the archipelago. Neither the ARF, nor Track II institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) has been effective in reducing tensions on either the Taiwan or the South China Sea issues, and as such there are still red lines marking what Beijing is an is not willing to discuss in multilateral fora.As well, the development of the NSC has had little effect on China's military modernisation and development. Sharp increases in the PLA's budget have been observed over the past five years, and at the same time the PLA continues to strengthen itself through indigenous research and the purchase of foreign weapons and materiel, most visibly in the areas of maritime power projection capabilities (including air and sea power).42 In terms of great power relations, it is uncertain whether the current warming relations between the United States and China will continue into the long term or will cool again as China's military and diplomatic power continues to grow. Those who adhere to the idea of China as a rising military power may question whether the NSC could be considered a way stop for the country, allow it more time to not only further develop its power projection abilities, but also to resolve many key issues on the domestic level, including solidifying the new leadership in the country, managing an economy which is burgeoning but still at risk from many obstacles, including unemployment, speculation, inflation and the ongoing reform of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, although the NSC does demonstrate a great deal of confidence on the part of China in its current security policies, this should not be mistaken for either retrenchment or retreat in Chinese military development.

Conclusions

The development of the new security concept in China is an ambitious attempt for Beijing to move its strategic views further away from traditional cold war thinking. Moreover, China has attempted to match words with deeds by embracing cooperation both on the bilateral and the 42 Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force," International Security 28(4) (Spring 2004): 161-2. 18 multilateral arenas. China's participation in the ARF and APEC has matured, and at the same time China remains committed to the development of the security institution which it had such a strong hand in creating, the SCO. However, much will depend on whether the ideas of strategic cooperation are able to withstand possible future pressures from the West or elsewhere for the development of an Asian alliance network. At present, very little has been made of this idea beyond the speculation stage, but should that change, Beijing will be extremely hard-pressed to avoid responding. Moreover, should China's political, economic and military growth continue at its present pace (a process which is not guaranteed), the same pressures placed on previous rising great powers may be brought to bear on Beijing, which may opt to discard or scale back its NSC policies in favour of more direct unilateralism. The "new security concept" is still in its infancy in the realm of Chinese foreign policymaking. However, its effects are already beginning to have a profound effect on regional and international security developments, and for that reason, greater international efforts to understand these changes to China's maturing security policies should be encouraged. The further development of the NSC will be contingent upon key changes both within China, and in the global community.